Peer-Reviewed Articles

Duque, Marina G. Forthcoming. “Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach.International Studies Quarterly.  [Appendix | Replication]

How do states achieve status? Although we rely on status to explain important phenomena in international politics—such as wars and the foreign policy of emerging powers—we still do not understand what status is or where it comes from. Previous research treats status as a function of state attributes, such as wealth and military capability. Following Weber, I argue that status depends on social recognition: it concerns identification processes in which an actor gains admission into a club once they follow the rules of membership. Therefore, systematic social processes, which cannot be reduced to state attributes, influence status. In particular, status is self-reinforcing. Moreover, social closure influences status—which implies that (i) a state’s existing relations influence its ability to achieve status, and (ii) states recognize similar states rather than states with the largest portfolio of certain attributes. To investigate the determinants of international status, I move beyond ranking states based on attributes to examine quantitatively how status emerges from state relations. Leveraging inferential network analysis, I examine state practices that express recognition—specifically, the network of embassies. The analysis indicates that self-reinforcing dynamics and social closure, rather than state attributes directly, drive status recognition.

Duque, Marina Guedes. 2009. “The Synthesis Made by the Copenhagen School in International Security Studies [in Portuguese]. Contexto Internacional, 31(3): 459-501.


Book Chapters

Duque, Marina. 2016. “The Rascals’ Paradise: Brazilian National Identity in 2010.” In Making Identity Count: Building a National Identity Database, edited by Ted Hopf and Bentley B. Allan, 47-62. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. [Book]

Working Papers

“The Core-Periphery Structure of the International Status Hierarchy” (email for a copy)

Although a hierarchy of status is often assumed in IR, we still do not know how it emerges. Existing approaches see hierarchy as a reflection of states’ properties, but neglect structural factors. I argue that systematic social processes, which cannot be reduced to the attributes of states, shape the status hierarchy. First, hierarchy emerges from social closure. Therefore, the status hierarchy has a tightly-knit club of states at the top, bound together by common attributes. Second, because status is self-reinforcing, the high-status club is not very permeable. Third, club members share a coherent set of attributes that outsiders lack. To investigate how the status hierarchy emerges, I examine state practices that express recognition—specifically, the network of embassies. Using up-to-date network analysis, I find that the network has a core-periphery structure. Moreover, there is little mobility in status relations, as both the size and composition of the network core remain stable over time. Using a Boolean logit approach, I show that core membership is a function of both material resources and fundamental values. The lifestyle of contemporary high-status states thus involves not only the ability to fend for oneself under anarchy, but also a Western standard of civilization.


Work in Progress

“The Case for a Status Model of Recognition”

When are power transitions violent? Anarchy-based theories cannot adequately account for peaceful transitions. Theories drawing on Hegel posit that misrecognition—treatment that contradicts a state’s self-image—causes war. Following an identity model of recognition (Honneth 1996), these theories tie recognition to self-esteem. Because it takes a psychological perspective, the identity model ignores what else is at stake during power transitions: the redistribution of privileges. Moreover, it ultimately cannot explain why states are recognized or not. I propose a status model of recognition (Fraser 2000; 2001) to analyze power transitions. Drawing on Weber, the status model takes a sociological perspective to define misrecognition as a form of institutionalized social subordination. In this model, emerging powers want to be recognized as equal partners in the management of the international order. Hegemonic wars happen when the emerging power is denied the status of full member in the great power club and the privileges that go with it. In contrast, peaceful transitions occur when the emerging power is deemed to conform to the rules of membership of the great power club and therefore recognized as an equal. To understand power transitions, we need to consider the distributions of both identities and privileges among states.

“The Logic of Expressive Rationality”

My research suggests that the role of status in international politics could be broader and more complex than assumed by the literature, which emphasizes a causal link between status-seeking and war. Because fundamental values such as democracy and economic liberalism are especially relevant for status recognition, there seems to be a structure of incentives for status-seeking states to adopt prevailing international norms. As such, status-seeking behavior may reinforce the international order by promoting norm adoption, rather than only exacerbating conflict. Why do states acquire status symbols? IR scholars usually explain state behavior with reference to the logic of consequences or the logic of appropriateness. Neither logic, however, can adequately account for status-seeking behavior. To do so, I turn to a logic of action introduced by Weber and founded on status: the logic of expressive rationality. According to this logic, behavior has an expressive role—it expresses an actor's identity. Expressive rationality explains why status symbols such as democracy are diffused from high- to low-status states. High-status states act as trendsetters by defining the standard of behavior for "modern" or "civilized" states. States that want to be modern or civilized follow suit, acquiring the corresponding status symbols.

“Patterns of Visa Diplomacy: The International Travel Freedom Dataset (2006-2015)” (w/ Andrew Rosenberg)