Duque, Marina G. Forthcoming. “Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach.” International Studies Quarterly. [Appendix | Replication]
How do states achieve status? Although we rely on status to explain important phenomena in international politics—such as wars and the foreign policy of emerging powers—we still do not understand what status is or where it comes from. Previous research treats status as a function of state attributes, such as wealth and military capability. Following Weber, I argue that status depends on social recognition: it concerns identification processes in which an actor gains admission into a club once they follow the rules of membership. Therefore, systematic social processes, which cannot be reduced to state attributes, influence status. In particular, status is self-reinforcing. Moreover, social closure influences status—which implies that (i) a state’s existing relations influence its ability to achieve status, and (ii) states recognize similar states rather than states with the largest portfolio of certain attributes. To investigate the determinants of international status, I move beyond ranking states based on attributes to examine quantitatively how status emerges from state relations. Leveraging inferential network analysis, I examine state practices that express recognition—specifically, the network of embassies. The analysis indicates that self-reinforcing dynamics and social closure, rather than state attributes directly, drive status recognition.
Duque, Marina Guedes. 2009. “The Synthesis Made by the Copenhagen School in International Security Studies” [in Portuguese]. Contexto Internacional, 31(3): 459-501.
Duque, Marina. 2016. “The Rascals’ Paradise: Brazilian National Identity in 2010.” In Making Identity Count: Building a National Identity Database, edited by Ted Hopf and Bentley B. Allan, 47-62. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. [Book]
“The Core and the Periphery: How Relations Shape the International Status Hierarchy” (email for a copy)
What are the foundations of the international status hierarchy? Although hierarchy is assumed in most studies of status, crucial questions remain. Which countries belong to the top of the international status hierarchy, and why? To address this puzzle, I propose a relational approach. Drawing on Weber, I argue that the international status hierarchy emerges from a process of social closure, which has two aspects: connectedness and commonality. In terms of connectedness, members of a status club have dense relations with each other and relatively sparse relations with outsiders. In terms of commonality, members of a status club share a ``bundle" of status symbols, both material and nonmaterial, that signify the lifestyle expected of club members. I investigate social closure in the context of diplomatic relations. First, I examine whether the network of embassies has a core-periphery structure—in which central actors are more likely to share ties, and actors at the margins are more likely to be connected to central actors than to actors in the periphery. I then use a Boolean logit approach to test whether states need to have a bundle of status symbols in order to belong in the core. I find that the network has a core-periphery structure and that states at the core tend to have high levels of not only military spending but also democracy and economic liberalism. The lifestyle of contemporary high-status states thus involves not only the ability to fend for oneself under anarchy, but also a Western standard of civilization.
Work in Progress
“The Case for a Status Model of Recognition”
When are power transitions violent? Anarchy-based theories cannot adequately account for peaceful transitions. Theories drawing on Hegel posit that misrecognition—treatment that contradicts a state’s self-image—causes war. Following an identity model of recognition (Honneth 1996), these theories tie recognition to self-esteem. Because it takes a psychological perspective, the identity model ignores what else is at stake during power transitions: the redistribution of privileges. Moreover, it ultimately cannot explain why states are recognized or not. I propose a status model of recognition (Fraser 2000; 2001) to analyze power transitions. Drawing on Weber, the status model takes a sociological perspective to define misrecognition as a form of institutionalized social subordination. In this model, emerging powers want to be recognized as equal partners in the management of the international order. Hegemonic wars happen when the emerging power is denied the status of full member in the great power club and the privileges that go with it. In contrast, peaceful transitions occur when the emerging power is deemed to conform to the rules of membership of the great power club and therefore recognized as an equal. To understand power transitions, we need to consider the distributions of both identities and privileges among states.
“The Logic of Expressive Rationality”
My research suggests that the role of status in international politics could be broader and more complex than assumed by the literature, which emphasizes a causal link between status-seeking and war. Because fundamental values such as democracy and economic liberalism are especially relevant for status recognition, there seems to be a structure of incentives for status-seeking states to adopt prevailing international norms. As such, status-seeking behavior may reinforce the international order by promoting norm adoption, rather than only exacerbating conflict. Why do states acquire status symbols? IR scholars usually explain state behavior with reference to the logic of consequences or the logic of appropriateness. Neither logic, however, can adequately account for status-seeking behavior. To do so, I turn to a logic of action introduced by Weber and founded on status: the logic of expressive rationality. According to this logic, behavior has an expressive role—it expresses an actor's identity. Expressive rationality explains why status symbols such as democracy are diffused from high- to low-status states. High-status states act as trendsetters by defining the standard of behavior for "modern" or "civilized" states. States that want to be modern or civilized follow suit, acquiring the corresponding status symbols.
“Patterns of Visa Diplomacy: The International Travel Freedom Dataset (2006-2015)” (w/ Andrew Rosenberg)